, this paper, we are going to review different interpre&y membership functions that appeared in-the the past three decades. These are interpretafuzziness might stem from. Depending on culus all together.
n 2, we give basic interpretations that appeared eaning of the membership function ement-theoretic framework. Measurement theory valuable insights to the meaning of membership [19, 13, 14, 18, 6, 21 . However, measurement not guide us as to how one should elicit membership functions. This downside and the philosophical assumption inherent in the measurement theory is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 gives conclusions and further research directions.
Interpretations of membership functions
In defining the concept of fuzzy membership, at the formal level, there is not much difficulty: a fuzzy (sub)set, say F, has a membership function p~, defined as a function from a well defined universe (the referential set), X, into the unit intervalas: p~ : X + [O, 11. Hence, the vague predicate "John (z) is tall (57)'' is represented by a number in the unit interval, p~( z ) .
There are several possible answers to the question "What does it mean to say p~ (2) = 0.7?' likelihood view 70% of a given population declared that John is tall.
random set view 70% of a given population described "tall" as an interval containing John's height.
similarity view John's height is away from the prototypical object which is truly "tall" to the degree 0.3 (a normalized distance.
utility view 0.7 is the utility of asserting that John is tall. measurement view When compared to others, John is taller than some and this fact can be encoded as 0.7 on some scale.
These interpretations can further be summarized as: subjective versus objective on one dimension and individual versus group on the other as depicted in Figure 1 . Both the likelihoodand the random set views of the membership function implicitly assume that there is more than one evaluator or experiments are repeated. Therefore, if one thinks of membership functions as "meaning representation", they come close to the claim that "meaning is essentially objective" and fuzziness arises from inconsistency or error. On the other hand, during the initial phases of the development of fuzzy sets, it has been widely accepted that membership functions are subjective and context dependent [20, 21] . The similarity and utility views of the membership function differ from the others in their espousing a subjective interpretation. The measurement view is in the connection of subjective and objective views in the sense that the problem can be defined in both ways depending on the observer(s) who is (are) making the comparison. The comparisons can be results of subjective evaluations or results of "precise" (or idealized) measurements (see [5] for more details on each interpretation).
One can identify eight major methods of eliciting membership functions (see [5] 
Measurement theory
The interpretations of the membership function can be evaluated within the framework of measurement theory [9, 15, 121 . Measurement theory is concerned with representation and meaningfulness of the particular representation. Most often than not, mathematical structures are investigated in their own right without any application in mind. This is essential to the growth of human mathematical enterprise. On the other hand, fuzzy set theory is an empirical science; it cIaims that it represents a natural phenomena that is observable in our everyday Iives: fuzziness. Therefore a theory of fuzzy sets must have clear correspondences in our daily lives as well.
Measurement theory bridges that gap by raking a phenomenon which can be modeIIed as an algebraic structure (e.g. fuzziness) and by mapping it into a numerical structure (hence capturing the essential core of the measurement process). In such a theory one can discuss the representation of a qualitative structure and the meaningfulness of such a representation (see Figure 2 ). The main contribution of measurement-theoretic frameworks to fuzzy set theory is the clear exposition of ideal conditions under which measurement of fuzziness can be carried out. These frameworks produced the information depicted in Figures 3 and 4 . Figure 3 shows the axioms required for different scales of measurement. Therefore, in theory one might achieve cardinal scales (ratio and even absolute) at the cost of accepting very restrictive structural axioms like Solvability and Homogeneity [3] . If the proofs of the theorems that give rise to Figure 3 are investigated, it would be noticed that the proof of ratio and absolute scale representation theorems are non-constructive. From an empirical point of view, such proofs are not entirely satisfactory because they provide no way to approximate the representation to a particular level of accuracy. In measurement theory, researchers go to some pains to arrive at constructive proofs that can actually be used to devise approximation procedures which in turn translate to practical measurement techniques (see [ll, Chapter 221 for a thorough discussion of meaningfulness.).
In any case, one at least needs to be aware of these axioms or be able to verify them empirically and/or on normative grounds. This verification is closely related to the semantics implicitly subscribed to. One should expect different axioms to hold for likelihood, similarity, utility, and random set views. A fuzzy set theorist has a very unique problem at hand: consider the interpretation of the membership function before anything else and then choose an appropriate calculus for that interpretation in the light of measurement theory. 
Interpretation
Elicitation method Notice that, in this framework, fuzzy set theory appears as an extension of the classical theory (where the classical notion of truth is extended to care for the borderline cases) as was originally suggested in [20] .
However, the actual measurement process is usually error-prone. Measurement theory has little to say in this regard. The theory assumes m ideal world (a consequence of the objectivist account of meaning). What measurement theory can prescribe in this case is a position taken by Adams et al. in 1965 in the context of statistics and meaningfulness:
"the practice of ignoring scale type in making statistical tests could lead to the formulation of empirically meaningless hypotheses." [l, p. 1241.
We should expect an analogous statement to hold for fuzzy set theory.
One could pose a reverse question as follows. Instead of using measurement theory to provide a semantics for fuzzy set theory why not use fuzzy set theory to account for the errors of measurement in measurement theory. This is precisely the question in [7] and it leads to a modified measurement theory where errors are explicitly accounted for using infinite-valued Lukasiewicz logic. This is certainly a deviation from the ideal world of objectivism and requires to take fuzzy logic as a more basic theory on which measurement theory can be built on. Unfortunately, this way, we can not gain any understanding on the semantics of fuzzy logic.
This type of approach is at the heart of "fuzzifying" a classical theory without being able to articulate how the semantics of the modified theory is affected
Conclusions and Further Research
Over the last two decades there have been efforts to justify the meaning of membership functions and the operations on them using measurement theory. This framework sheds valuable insight into the meaning of the membership functions and into the semantics of fuzzy set theory in general. Figure 3 is a guide, prescribed by measurementtheoretic considerations, that every fuzzy modeller needs to be aware of. The general point is this: elicitation of membership functions (and also the operations on the membership function) are closely tied to the interpretation one subscribes to.
However, it is important to realize where measurement theory gets its license for prescribing a meaning. This is the objectivist account of meaning which is closely tied to the formdisvlogicist approaches to mathematics. This approach is idealist in the sense that it does not account for errors in measurement. Nevertheless, it provides an ideal world to be achieved. The measurement-theoretic results on fuzzy sets reported in the references of this paper should be evaluated regarding this fact.
On the other hand, there are various empirical approaches to measuring membership functions.
Measurementtheoretic results prescribe a theory of meaningfulness that is appropriate for such elicitation methods. Usually the elicitation methods do not stem from rigorous philosophical foundations as the objectivist account. But they stem from where objectivism fails, practicality. Lakoff [lo] gives a thorough discussion of empirical approaches with all their philosophical consequences. Future work for fuzzy set theory is to explore these empirical semantics as a basis in addition to the objectivist accounts of meaning.
Consider, for example, the similarity semantics of luzzy set theory [16] . In this account the membership function is assumed to measure the notion of similarity to a prototypical object. This is the prevailing semantic notion that underlies fuzzy clustering and neural-fuzzy techniques (the latter enjoying the convenience of both the likelihood and the similarity semantics). When the intuitive notion of similarity is taken as primitive, the underlying measurement theoretic structure usually assumes a metric space. Exploration of the measurement theoretic properties of this structure in the context of fuzzy set theory also lies in our future research ag 6 da. 
